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Introduction and summary
The primary question we address in this article is why
consumers, merchants, and financial institutions are
reluctant to embrace electronic payments even though
electronic payment networks, such as the credit card
and automated clearinghouse (ACH) networks, have
existed for more than 25 years. While most Internet-
based transactions are primarily processed via credit
card networks, most noncash off-line payments by
both consumers and businesses in the United States
are made with checks.
In the United States, there are over 15 checks
written per month per person.1 This is more than three
times the number of checks written per person in
Canada or the United Kingdom and at least 15 times
more per person than in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden, or Switzerland (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 2000, and Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 2001).2, 3
In this article, we incorporate various strands of
the payment literature to provide a more integrated
view as to why payment system participants are reluc-
tant to use electronic payments. Brito and Hartley (1995),
Hirschman (1982), Mantel (2000), Murphy (1988),
and Whitesell (1992) focus on consumer choice issues.
Radecki (1999) and Wells (1996) discuss the revenue
earned and cost to financial institutions from provid-
ing check services. Food Marketing Institute (1994,
1998, and 2000), Chakravorti and To (1999), and
Murphy and Ott (1977) concentrate on the merchants’
perspectives. McAndrews (1997) and Weinberg
(1997) investigate the network issues. Connolly and
Eisenmenger (2000), Benston and Humphrey (1997),
Green and Todd (2001), Guynn (1996), and Lacker
and Weinberg (1998) discuss the Federal Reserve’s
role in the payment system. A more integrated analy-
sis of the underlying incentives of various payment
system participants has been developed by Baxter
(1983), Chakravorti and Emmons (2001), Chakravorti
and Shah (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2000), and
Wright (2000).
We study the incentives underlying the payment
network to examine why, unlike several other indus-
trialized countries, the United States has been slow to
abandon checks. Many observers claim that electronic
payments are less expensive than checks. However,
these social cost comparisons usually ignore transition
costs and the underlying incentives to each payment
participant. Furthermore, the provision and usage of
payment services exhibit network effects, more com-
monly referred to as the chicken-and-egg problem,
which may impede the adoption of new payment tech-
nologies. Even if electronic payments are less expen-
sive and they can overcome the chicken-and-egg
problem, consumers, merchants, and financial insti-
tutions may still be reluctant to move to electronic
payments. We analyze why this is so. In addition,
we explore actions by the Federal Reserve to improve
the check processing system and whether this could
possibly hinder the migration away from checks.
Finally, we discuss potential drivers to the adoption
of electronic payments.
Check usage
We use two different sources of check data in this
article. The first source is the annual payments data
published by the Bank for International Settlements45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(BIS). The second source of data is a comprehensive
review of the retail payment systems by the Federal
Reserve System (Fed) (2001). The Fed study indicated
that the total volume of check payments in the United
States was significantly lower than previously estimat-
ed. However, the data published by the BIS still pro-
vide valuable insights into check usage in other countries
and check usage trends in the United States. We rely
on the new Fed study for current check values and
volumes and use the older data reported to the BIS
by the Fed for trends in check values and volume.
According to the new Fed benchmarking study
released in November 2001, 49.6 billion checks were
written in the U.S. in 2000, valued at $47.7 trillion
(Federal Reserve System, 2001).4 Checks represented
around 60 percent of non-cash consumer transactions.
The Fed study estimates that consumers wrote around
51 percent of checks but only accounted for 19 per-
cent of the total value. According to the BIS (1991–
2000), per capita check volume grew at a compounded
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.13 percent, while
per capita check value grew at a 1.91 percent CAGR
from 1991 to 1999.5
Unlike most other industrialized countries, the
U.S. seems to have experienced growth in total check
volume and value during the 1990s. For every Group
of Ten (G-10) country except the United States, the
volume of check usage (see figure 1) and value (see
figure 2) declined during the 1990s.6 Among the rea-
sons that have been cited to explain U.S. check vol-
ume growth are differences in financial institutions
per capita, cash usage, laws and regulations, and pric-
ing of financial services (see BIS, 1999 and 2000,
and Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala, 2000).
By increasing the price of checks vis-à-vis other
payment options, financial institutions in Scandinavian
countries have been successful in decreasing check
usage. For example, in Finland, during the mid-1980s,
banks began implementing a small per-check fee of
about 10 cents. Palva (2000) states that this pricing
policy coincided with a drastic reduction in the use
of checks (see figure 3).
Adopting similar policies, Norwegian banks also
successfully decreased check usage. Humphrey, Kim,
and Vale (2001) found that a 1 percent increase in the
price of checks resulted in a 1.07 percent decrease in
check usage. They also found that online debit cards
were a close substitute for checks at the point of sale.7
As a result, check usage in Norway decreased from
72 million checks in 1988 to only 6.2 million in 2000.
Furthermore, the volume of payments made by pay-
ment cards, primarily debit cards, was 62 times that
of checks in 2000 (Bank of Norway, 2000).
Other countries have used different approaches
to reduce check usage. For example, Canadian banks
give check payees immediate credit and availability of
their funds (see Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala, 2000).
Furthermore, checks are backdated to remove any float
benefit to paying banks. In addition, corporations are
charged for the float when the distance is significant
between the bank where the check is drawn and where
it is first deposited.
The decline in check usage across most countries
indicates that, given market incentives, there is a move-
ment toward electronic instruments. Electronic alter-
natives to accessing transaction accounts for purchases
are held to be less expensive than checks. Humphrey
and Berger (1990) were the first to calculate the total
social cost of each instrument in the United States.
Social cost is the sum of the real resource cost borne
by each participant to convert a given payment into
good funds. They found the social cost of a cash trans-
action to be the lowest at 4 cents and a credit card trans-
action to be the highest at 88 cents. An ACH payment,
an online debit transaction, and a check transaction
have social costs of 29 cents, 47 cents, and 79 cents,
respectively. Wells (1996) updated Humphrey and
Berger’s study and found that ACH payments cost
between one-third to one-half as much as a check
payments but found significantly higher social cost
estimates for both checks and ACH payments.
A difficulty with comparing social cost among
payment instruments is that a given payment instrument
may not be preferred for both small and large trans-
actions. While cash transactions outnumber all other
types of transactions, the average transaction size is
relatively small compared with other payment instru-
ments. Consumers tend to prefer checks for larger trans-
actions. The average consumer check transaction is
estimated at $364 (Federal Reserve System, 2001).
Furthermore, consumers may not be able to use all pay-
ment instruments for all types of transactions. For
example, cash cannot be used for bill payment via
mail and checks are difficult to use for Internet trans-
actions. Additionally, these social cost calculations
may not adequately adjust for the risk of not being
able to convert the payment into good funds that may
play a role in the acceptance of certain payment instru-
ments. Some characteristics of payment instruments
are difficult to quantify, such as the convenience and
comfort levels enjoyed by the participants.
These estimates also ignore transition costs and
network effects. Consumers, merchants, and financial
institutions may be unwilling to invest in emerging
payment technologies due to uncertainty about wheth-
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U.S. smart card trials demonstrated that consumers
and merchants may not be willing to adopt new forms
of payment rapidly.8
Lack of incentives
In this section of the article, we analyze the cost
and incentive structure faced by each participant in
the payment network. We address two fundamental
questions for consumers, merchants, and financial in-
stitutions. First, are electronic payment alternatives
less expensive than checks for each participant? Sec-
ond, if electronic payment forms are less expensive,
are participants reluctant to abandon checks because
they lack the right incentives to adopt alternative pay-
ment instruments?
Consumers
While checks might be more costly to society as a
whole, several studies point out that consumers may
view the marginal cost to use a check to be zero.9 Re-
cently, several banks have reintroduced free checking
accounts to entice new customers.10 Humphrey, Pul-
ley, and Vesala (2000) state that most U.S. consumers
prefer accounts with fixed monthly fees or no fees
with minimum balance requirements to those with
per-check transaction fees. Furthermore, merchants
rarely impose additional fees for check payments.
Moreover, some consumers still view check float
as a major benefit. Today, most checks are processed
overnight and interest rates on transaction accounts,
if they are offered, are quite low, resulting in low float
benefits. Wells (1996) calculated that float is no longer
significant for consumer check payments. Nonetheless,
some consumers still may perceive significant float
benefits.
Ironically, checks do not have a built-in feature
that automatically declines a transaction if the custom-
er’s account does not have sufficient funds. While
non-sufficient-funds fees are relatively high and may
lead to several other checks bouncing, most consum-
ers seem to ignore these costs. However, non-sufficient
funds fee income is large for financial institutions,
potentially reducing banks’ incentive to promote
some electronic payment alternatives.
Independent of the cost of check payments, we
can identify three key reasons consumers have resist-
ed abandoning checks. First, checks are easy to use.
The 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances indicated that
about 87 percent of U.S. households had checking
accounts, making checks the most accessible noncash
payment instrument.11 Checks are also one of the most
widely accepted forms of payment by merchants at
the point of sale.12 For bill payments, checks are the
most popular instrument because, unlike other forms
of payment, they are almost always accepted by billers.1348 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
Second, consumers are reluctant to switch to elec-
tronic alternatives unless they offer superior benefits
to checks. While consumers may believe that electronic
payments are less expensive overall, they are reluctant
to change unless they view the shift as beneficial to
them. Credit card issuers often offer additional services
such as extended warranties, dispute resolution servic-
es, and frequent-use awards, along with interest-free
short-term loans to those who pay off their balances
each month.
Third, some consumers feel checks give them great-
er control over the timing of their payments, leading
to better budgeting. Hirschman (1982) argues that some
consumers believe that checks may enhance their abil-
ity to track, budget, and control spending better than
other payment instruments. Mester (2000) argues that
checks give consumers more control over when to pay
bills than pre-authorized ACH payments and can more
easily attach remittance information. Yet, consumers
can also access their checking accounts via their deb-
it cards and maintain budgeting, tracking, and control
over their funds. When using debit cards, consumers
cannot overdraw their accounts unless previous credit
lines have been established. However, debit card us-
age in bill payment is relatively low, given the slow
adoption of the necessary infrastructure.
Because consumers perceive checks to be a low-
cost payment instrument and are comfortable with them,
they are reluctant to change unless there are strong
incentives to do so. From a cost standpoint, checks are
relatively inexpensive if one ignores non-sufficient-
funds fees. As we noted earlier, explicit per-check charg-
es by financial institutions in other countries have been
effective in changing consumers’ payment habits.
Merchants
A primary issue for merchants is the cost of pay-
ments. There are significant differences in the cost of
accepting alternative payment instruments. The Food
Marketing Institute (FMI) (2000) estimates the mer-
chant’s cost to accept each payment instrument (see
table 1). Online debit cards are the second least ex-
pensive payment instrument for merchants
to accept at 80 cents per $100 of transac-
tions. They offer merchants immediate
funds, low per-transaction fees, and little,
if any, settlement risk. While cash pro-
cessing costs are low at 90 cents per $100
of sales, most consumers are reluctant to
use cash for larger purchases. Credit card
and off-line debit card transactions cost
merchants an average of $1.80 per $100 in
sales. The average check transaction costs
merchants 80 cents per $100 in sales, though this cost
varies widely depending on whether the check was
verified.
Given the rapid increase in the use of check veri-
fication systems during the last decade, it is important
to analyze check costs using this technology. Nilson
(2001a) estimates that 9.14 billion checks were veri-
fied at the point of sale. Using Federal Reserve System
(2001) point-of-sale check numbers, we estimate that
between 75 percent and 97 percent of checks written
at the point of sale were verified in 2000.14 The typi-
cal cost for these services ranges from 2 cents to 20
cents per check (Nilson, 1997b). Nilson reports an
average cost of 3 cents in 1998.15
Merchants have found that check verification ser-
vices significantly reduce the risk that they will not
receive good funds. As a result, they have been able
to lower their costs by over 23 percent and to reduce
losses from exception items from 0.50 percent of the
value of the check to 0.05 percent of the value of the
check (FMI, 1998).16
According to FMI (2000), a verified check pay-
ment is actually the cheapest form of payment for the
merchant to accept, costing a merchant 60 cents per
$100 in sales versus $3.00 per $100 in sales for an
unverified check.17 Since the majority of checks at
the point of sale appear to be verified, it is important
to concentrate on the cost of verified checks. According
to FMI (2000), the cost of a verified check per $100 in
sales is significantly less than cash, off-line debit cards,
and credit cards. Although FMI (2000) did not report
a cost for ACH-based debit card transactions, FMI
(1998) reported an average cost of 82 cents in 1997.
The cost difference between a verified check trans-
action and an online debit card transaction might also
be growing. Between 1997 and 2000, FMI (1998 and
2000) found that the cost of online debit cards increased
by 14 percent, or 10 cents per $100 in sales.18 Recent-
ly, several networks have announced plans to increase
their fees significantly.19
Even if checks are more expensive than electronic
alternatives, merchants may continue to accept checks
TABLE 1
Merchant costs to accept a payment instrument
Cost per Check
transaction not Check Online Off-line
(dollars) Cash verified verified Credit debit debit
Cost per
$100 sales .90 3.00 .60 1.80 .80 1.80
Source: Food Marketing Institute, 2000.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
for three reasons. First, the potential cost savings from
electronic alternatives might not be large enough to
justify the transition costs to make this change and/or
risk movement to more expensive payment vehicles.
Second, cheaper electronic payment alternatives at
the point of sale have only recently flourished. Last,
checks might offer merchants some level of benefits
that they are willing to “pay” for.
Given the slow movement away from checks,
merchants, banks, and third-party providers have start-
ed to convert check transactions to ACH transactions
at the point of sale to reduce costs.20 However, this
may involve high initial set-up costs related to imple-
menting a new system, purchasing equipment, and
training staff. Furthermore, merchants may be reluc-
tant to make large investments in new payment tech-
nologies with uncertain futures.
Furthermore, even though online debit cards are
a relatively inexpensive payment option, they have be-
come widespread only recently. Annual per capita trans-
action volume in the United States increased from 0.76
transactions per year in 1990 to 11.3 transactions in
2000 (BIS, 1991–2000, and Thomson Financial, 2001).
Figure 4 shows the rapid increase in debit card trans-
actions over the last five years. Figure 5 shows the
increase in online debit card terminals installed by mer-
chants, indicating substantial growth in merchant ac-
ceptance of online debit cards over the last 13 years.
Lastly, some evidence suggests that merchants are
willing to accept high-cost payment instruments be-
cause they offer benefits not offered by other instru-
ments. Credit cards generate sales to illiquid consumers
who may not otherwise be able to purchase goods and
services.21 In some instances, merchants may choose
to accept certain instruments because they are tied to
other instruments that they choose to accept. For ex-
ample, merchants accepting Visa or MasterCard credit
cards are required to accept their off-line debit card prod-
ucts. A large group of retailers led by Wal-Mart has sued
the credit card associations, alleging that this tying of
their credit card and debit card products is illegal.
Available U.S. data do not indicate a significant
cost reduction if merchants move toward electronic
payments. Furthermore, the benefits of accepting
electronic payment instruments may not outweigh
the investment that may be required. Merchants may
be willing to accept relatively expensive payment in-
struments because they offer benefits such as the po-
tential to increase sales and profits.
Financial institutions
Although electronic payments are generally per-
ceived to be less expensive than paper-based pay-
ments for financial institutions, several U.S. studies
indicate the costs of processing ACH and check pay-
ments are not very large for financial institutions.
FIGURE 4
millions of transactions
Source: Nilson (1996–2001), Nos. 737, 726, 705, 678, 654, and 627.
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FIGURE 5
per 1 million inhabitants
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The Federal Reserve Board’s 1994 Functional Cost
Analysis estimated that the average cost per transaction
for an ACH payment was 14 cents and the average cost
for a check payment was 14.6 cents. Wells (1996) es-
timated that the cost of processing a check ranged from
15 cents to 43 cents, while the cost of processing an
ACH payment ranged from 12 cents to 45 cents. Guynn
(1996) questions whether ACH payments are really less
expensive for banks to process than checks. However,
evidence from Norway indicates that check transactions
cost banks two to three times as much as electronic
giro services and electronic funds transfer point-of-
sale transactions (Robinson and Flatraaker, 1995).
Furthermore, financial institutions earn significant
revenue from the provision of check services. On aver-
age, they charge customers 21 cents and merchants 5
cents to process each check.22 In order to spur adop-
tion, online debit cards should offer financial institu-
tions similar revenue opportunities assuming similar
cost structures, or similar profit opportunities result-
ing from offsetting cost savings. Online debit cards
provide a potentially lucrative revenue stream in the
form of the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cus-
tomer’s bank, commonly referred to as the interchange
fee. Yet, as of the end of 2001, no online debit card
network had interchange fees higher than 20 cents.23
Recently, a few online debit card networks have sig-
nificantly increased their processing fees. Several in-
stitutions have also implemented per-transaction fees
for using personal identification number (PIN) based
debit cards at the point of sale.24
Financial institutions also earn significant revenue
from fees related to overdrafts to checking accounts.
According to Bank Administration Institute and PSI
Global (1998), in 1995, banks earned $8.1 billion from
non-sufficient-funds check fees. The Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (1996) estimated
that banks’ losses from check fraud amounted to
$615 million in 1995, $215 million of which was
FIGURE 6
Check verification and guarantee dollar value
billion of 1999 dollars
Source: Nilson, 2001a, 2000b, 1999b, 1997b, and 1996b,
Nos. 742, 715, 691, 644, and 618.
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eventually recovered. Debit cards could significantly
reduce or eliminate overdrawn accounts, because
transactions are only processed if funds are available.
However, by promoting online debit cards, financial
institutions would reduce their revenue from non-
sufficient-funds fees.25
If electronic payment instruments were less ex-
pensive than checks, financial institutions might be
able to influence consumer usage and merchant accep-
tance of electronic payments as evidenced in Norway
and Finland. However, U.S. financial institutions may
be reluctant to impose explicit per-check usage fees
due to competitive pressures.
Some financial observers have argued that the large
number of payment providers in the United States might
prevent financial institutions from implementing price
increases and cost-saving measures. One initiative by
a Midwest bank to charge consumers for using bank
tellers initially met with consumer resistance and little
support from other financial institutions. Stavins (1999)
found that regional competition prevented banks from
not returning canceled checks because they feared
customers might switch to a rival bank that returned
checks. Yet, some financial institutions were eventual-
ly successful in implementing both of these policies.
Whether electronic payments are less expensive
to process than checks for financial institutions is de-
batable. However, even if electronic payments are less
expensive, the potential revenue from checks, especial-
ly in the form of non-sufficient-funds fee income, is
difficult for financial institutions to forgo.
The Federal Reserve
Central banks differ in the roles they play in the
operation and oversight of their domestic payment
system (see Bank for International Settlements, 1999
and 2000). Most central banks of industrialized coun-
tries are involved in the settlement of retail payment
transactions and some also play a clearing role. In the
United States, the Fed is a provider of interbank check
clearing services and is the largest ACH operator.
Whether there remains a compelling need for the
Fed to provide check-processing services is debatable,
given technological and regulatory changes. When
creating the Fed, the U.S. Congress stipulated that it
should improve the efficiency and safety of the pay-
ment system.26 At the time the Fed was created in 1913,
checks were the primary means of interbank funds
transfer. Today, large-value domestic transactions are
processed electronically via Fedwire, which is oper-
ated by the Fed. In addition, electronic retail payment
alternatives, such as credit cards, debit cards, and
ACH payments, are increasing their market shares.27
The Federal Reserve has historically played an im-
portant role in the development of check processing.
However, some have questioned this role. Green and
Todd (2001) argue that as the United States transitions
to the next generation of payment instruments, the
Fed should promote “efficiency, integrity and acces-
sibility primarily by means other than direct service
provision—such as participation in the setting of stan-
dards, the drafting of model legislation and the regu-
lation of payment services markets” (Green and Todd,
2001, p. 1). They further argue that “encroaching on
activities that the private sector can perform efficiently
and equitably” may erode the Fed’s reputation as a
trustworthy and neutral institution.
The Fed’s role in check processing has declined
over the past two decades, partly due to regulatory
changes such as the Monetary Control Act of 1980
(MCA), the removal of interstate branching restrictions,
and changes to Regulation CC to allow banks to settle
checks in same-day funds. In the five years following
the passage of MCA—under the terms of which the
Fed had to price its financial services and make them
available to all financial institutions—the Fed’s share of
interbank check clearing decreased sharply.28 Summers
and Gilbert (1996) claim that the Fed’s share of check
volume decreased from 61.0 percent in 1980 to 49.8
percent in 1985.29 For the same period, its share of check
value decreased from 48.5 percent to 31.7 percent.
The Fed also experienced a sharp decrease in the
number of checks handled from 1993 to 1995. Given
the lack of reliable non-Fed check volume data for this
period, it is difficult to determine the cause of this de-
crease. Some financial observers claim that changes
in Regulation CC and the removal of interstate branch-
ing restrictions were at least partially responsible. In
1994, Regulation CC was changed to allow banks to
settle checks in same-day funds. These changes may
have resulted in more institutions using private clear-
inghouses. We would also expect that as banks merged,
the ratio of on-us transactions would increase. How-
ever, most estimates indicate that on-us check volume
has remained constant at around 30 percent.30
Alternatively, total check volume may have de-
creased during this period as a result of the adoption
of electronic alternatives. Therefore, the drop in Fed
volume would be attributable to a decrease in overall
check volume and not a change in market share. Per-
haps a more plausible explanation is that both a shift
to private-sector alternatives and substitution of other
payment instruments were responsible for the reduc-
tion in check volume. However, as stated before, in
the absence of reliable data, we can not determine the
magnitude of each effect.52 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
According to Federal Reserve System (1998), the
Fed processes a greater proportion of checks for smaller
depository institutions than private sector providers.
During the Committee on the Federal Reserve in the
Payments Mechanism (also known as the Rivlin Com-
mittee) public forums, several community banks in-
dicated that they feared that private entities would
not process checks at similar prices to those currently
charged if the Fed left the check processing industry.
Several banks and clearinghouses “freely admit that
they would charge more to clear these items than the
Federal Reserve now does, citing the higher costs in-
volved in serving these endpoints” (Federal Reserve
System, 1998). These institutions suggested that the
Fed subsidizes small institutions, especially those lo-
cated in remote locations.
The Fed has denied cross-subsidizing across its
priced-services product. According to Rivlin (1997,
p. 5), then vice-chair of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, each product in a multi-
product firm “should recover at least its incremental
production cost” to ensure that no individual product
is being subsidized.31 Using this standard, the Fed
does not subsidize any of its products. Similar argu-
ments could be made about the allocation of fixed costs
among customers that may result in certain custom-
ers paying a higher proportion of fixed costs. How-
ever, some distributions of allocating fixed costs
among customer segments may deter competitors
from entering industries where economies of scale
and scope are present.
Chakravorti, Gunther, and Moore (1999) suggest
that private-sector providers could cherry-pick the prof-
itable customers and leave the higher cost ones with
the Fed if low-cost customers pay more than the mar-
ginal cost to serve them. They argue that as low-cost
customers find other less-expensive check processors,
the price charged should rise for those remaining cus-
tomers. Eventually, the rise in cost may result in an
exit strategy for the Fed. Thus, these more expensive-
to-serve customers may eventually choose to promote
non-check payment alternatives by charging higher
check fees to their customers.
However, if the Fed improves check-processing
technology, such incentives would be reduced. Recent-
ly, the Fed has made large investments in improving
check-processing technology to lower its costs.32 It
continues to promote electronic check presentment.33
In 2000, the Fed electronically presented about 20
percent of the checks it handled. From 1995 to 2000,
the number of checks presented electronically grew
from 1 billion to 3.5 billion, or a 28.5 percent com-
pound annual growth rate (CAGR). Though the
physical checks still followed, this program allowed
for faster presentation of the check for payment. The
Fed also participated in projects where the check was
imaged or truncated at either the payee bank or at the
Fed and no paper was sent to the paying bank. More
than 7 percent of the checks the Federal Reserve han-
dled were processed in this manner in 2000.
While these changes are aimed at decreasing check-
processing costs, they may also affect the migration
to electronic alternatives. Specifically, a less-expen-
sive check-processing system may reduce the incen-
tives for financial institutions to migrate to electronic
alternatives. Lacker and Weinberg (1998, p. 19) argue
that “ECP (electronic check presentment) could be
viewed as an attempt to stem the expected decline in
check use. By reducing the cost of paper checks, ECP
could slow the transition to fully electronic payment
instruments that are even more beneficial.”
Benston and Humphrey (1997) suggest that the
Fed may not have sufficient reason to continue in the
check-processing business. Furthermore, they point
out that the Fed is virtually alone among central banks
of developed countries in the provision of check-pro-
cessing services to financial institutions. Bullock and
Ellis (1998) suggest that the “heavy involvement” of
the Fed in check processing, along with its role in reg-
ulating the industry, has kept the check competitive
with other payment instruments.
On the other hand, improvements in check pro-
cessing may allow for the electronification of checks,
while maintaining some features not presently avail-
able in competing payment instruments in the United
States, ultimately facilitating the movement to electron-
ic alternatives. Connolly and Eisenmenger (2000) ar-
gue that in some instances there is a need for the Fed
to take an operational role to improve the processing
of checks where the private sector may not be willing
to invest the necessary funds initially to adopt the
necessary infrastructure. Guynn (1996) suggests that
certain improvements in check processing may actu-
ally improve the adoption of electronic instruments.
Drivers to change
Given today’s underlying incentive structure, it
would appear that U.S. consumers, merchants, and
financial institutions are not likely to change their pay-
ment preferences in the near future. However, given
technological enhancements and competition from
nonbank payment providers, the incentives for pay-
ment system participants to use electronic alterna-
tives will increase. Financial institutions, along with
merchants, have started to “electronify” checks by
converting them to ACH payments. Given the right53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
incentives, consumers may also increase their use of
electronic payment instruments. In this section, we dis-
cuss drivers that might aid the transition away from
checks in the future.
U.S. consumers have only recently had electron-
ic alternatives for different types of payments. Credit
cards have surpassed checks as the most popular in-
strument used for point-of-sale transactions.34 Debit
cards are becoming increasingly popular at the point
of sale, and ACH payments continue to gain popular-
ity for recurring bill payment and payroll disbursements.
In addition, third-party providers are using new tech-
nologies to deliver payment card products and ACH
payments to new market segments.
Debit cards show the greatest promise to decrease
check volume at the point of sale. Debit cards offer con-
sumers access to their transaction account like checks
and allow merchants to receive their funds relatively
quickly, incurring little, if any, settlement risk. Mer-
chant acceptance of debit cards and the number of con-
sumers holding debit cards are growing rapidly. From
1995 to 1998, the number of households with a debit
card increased by a 27 percent CAGR. The success
of promoting debit card usage is partly due to the le-
veraging of existing credit card and automated teller
machine (ATM) networks and financial institutions’
ability to easily put the product in the wallets of their
consumers by increasing the functionality of their
ATM cards.35
Earlier, we noted that financial institutions may
not have sufficient incentives to promote online debit
cards. Recently, several electronic funds transfer net-
works have consolidated. In the process, several of
the largest networks have publicly stated that they in-
tend to increase the revenue to financial institutions
for participating in their networks (Breitkopf, 2001a).
Two of the most prominent networks announced their
plans to almost double their interchange fees (Breitkopf,
2001b). However, these plans were delayed more than
six months after several large retailers indicated that
they would discontinue processing transactions over
the networks if the rate increases went through.
Off-line debit card usage has also increased rapidly
and these cards now outnumber their online counterparts
in the United States. These cards provide financial in-
stitutions with similar levels of interchange fees to those
offered by credit cards, usually a percentage of the
purchase price. A few years ago, a group of merchants
filed a lawsuit against Visa and MasterCard, challenging
the “honor-all-cards” rules of the card associations.36
These rules stipulate that if merchants accept one of
the card association’s products such as credit cards, they
must accept all of the association-branded products.37
The merchants claim that few alternatives exist to the
general-purpose credit cards. Therefore, they are un-
willing to stop accepting credit cards but want the abili-
ty to decline the associations’ off-line debit cards.
A significant but not often discussed payment seg-
ment is the person-to-person (P2P) payment segment.38
The Federal Reserve System (2001) estimates that 11.2
percent of total check volume and 6.7 percent of total
check value in 2000 were consumer-to-consumer pay-
ments. Individuals are usually unable to accept ACH
payments or credit or debit card transactions. In the
last two years, banks and nonbanks have started to
enable individuals to accept these payment instruments.39
While the initial impact of P2P has been mostly lim-
ited to the online auction community, recent initiatives
by P2P providers have been geared toward capturing
a larger share of the non-auction online transactions.40
Some small businesses have begun to use P2P payment
services as a means to accept payments both within
and outside the auction community.
In the bill payment arena, depository institutions
(DIs) are facing competitive pressures from both third-
party providers and non-depository financial institu-
tions. Third-party providers began promoting the use
of electronic payments to many of the most profitable
customers for DIs. Brokerage firms and credit-card
banks, which already have a connection to many of
the DIs’ high-net-worth customers, have also been
actively promoting electronic bill payment services.
Depository institutions risk losing these integral rela-
tionships if they do not match or exceed the services
offered by these competitors. Thus, other providers ap-
pear to have accelerated the incentives for DIs to pro-
mote some forms of account-based electronic payments.
While checks continue to dominate the propor-
tion of non-cash payments, we have discussed several
drivers that should facilitate the migration to electronic
alternatives. Leveraging existing networks, debit cards
have gained significant market share, and financial
observers believe that debit card growth rates will con-
tinue to be higher than those of other established pay-
ment media. As more commerce is conducted remotely,
such as via the Internet, electronic payments’ share of
total payments will also increase, since paper instru-
ments may not be appropriate for these environments.
Furthermore, new payment providers, especially non-
bank providers, have started to leverage existing net-
works, such as debit and ACH networks, to allow
electronic person-to-person payments. As consumers
and merchants become comfortable with electronic pay-
ments in certain payment segments, there will likely
be spillover effects to other payment segments that
have traditionally been dominated by checks.54 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined why U.S. con-
sumers, merchants, and financial institutions have been
unwilling to significantly reduce their check usage. Con-
sumers lack incentives to change their habits. In the
United States, credit card issuers have been success-
ful in gaining point-of-sale market share by offering
incentives such as frequent-use awards and interest-free
short-term loans if monthly balances are paid in full.
However, in some environments, such as online pur-
chases, consumers may have little choice but to use
electronic alternatives. Consumers may become more
comfortable with electronic alternatives the more
they use them, resulting in faster market adoption.
For merchants, the cost to process checks, includ-
ing the risk of not being able to convert a payment to
good funds, may not be significantly greater than for
electronic alternatives such as online debit cards. How-
ever, merchants are also realizing the benefits of on-
line debit cards as evidenced by the rapid deployment
of point-of-sale terminals and the merchants’ antitrust
suit against the credit card associations. Merchants
may be gaining sufficient bargaining power with pay-
ment providers to impact existing cost structures in
ways that may increase usage of electronic alternatives.
Financial institutions in Finland and Norway
have been successful in convincing consumers to sig-
nificantly curtail their check usage and increase their
use of electronic payment forms by imposing per-check
fees. However, checks remain a substantial source of
revenue for U.S. financial institutions, especially in
terms of non-sufficient-funds fees. Electronic alterna-
tives, such as online debit cards, may not have been as
financially attractive, but new pricing policies by the
online debit card networks may entice financial insti-
tutions to promote them more heavily.
Some have questioned the role of the Fed in the
retail payments arena. While the Federal Reserve is ac-
tively promoting electronic alternatives, it continues
to improve check processing. Such improvements may
distort the market incentives to move to electronic pay-
ments. Even though the United States lags behind other
industrialized countries in its continued high usage of
checks, no studies to date have concluded that the mi-
gration to electronic substitutes for checks is welfare
enhancing in the U.S. context.
In this article, we have identified several poten-
tial drivers of electronic payments, such as greater choice
of payment instruments for consumers for different
payment segments, greater non-face-to-face shopping
opportunities, competition from non-bank payment
providers, and a greater role by merchants to offer the
low-cost payment alternatives. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that U.S. consumers are slowly changing their pay-
ment habits, and we would expect this trend to continue.
Further research is warranted as to why the Unit-
ed States lags other industrialized countries in adopt-
ing electronic alternatives. We have suggested that
changes need to occur in the underlying incentive
structure to convince all payment participants to mi-
grate to electronic payments. U.S. consumers, mer-
chants, and financial institutions are more likely to
make the transition to electronic payments, given the
growth in remote purchases, developments in tech-
nology, and greater market-based incentives to use
electronic alternatives.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1The number of checks written includes consumer, business, and
government checks. We focus only on consumer checks in this ar-
ticle. We use U.S. check data for 2000 from the new Federal Re-
serve System check survey and 1999 figures from BIS for the
other countries (Federal Reserve System, 2001, and BIS, 2000).
2The level of confidence in the payment statistics published by
BIS is questionable. Therefore, a great amount of care should be
exercised in interpreting them.
3A portion of the difference in per-capita check usage might be
attributable to higher levels of cash use in some of these countries.
Some countries with low check usage may have a high level of
cash usage, such as Japan. See BIS (1999) for a more detailed
discussion of these differences.
4Determining the volume and value of checks is difficult. While
the Federal Reserve knows the number and value of checks it pro-
cesses, it estimates the volume of checks processed by others. In
1999, Nilson (1996–2001), BIS (2000), and Green (1999) esti-
mated total U.S. check volume between 64 billion and 69 billion,
accounting for $47 trillion to $83 trillion. Prior to the 2001 study,
the Federal Reserve’s last benchmarking study was conducted in
1979. For more recent years, non-Fed check volume was extrapo-
lated from the 1979 study.
5We would expect that these numbers overestimate the growth rate
in check usage, given the 2001 Fed study, but no reliable evidence
indicates that growth has been negative during this period.
6The G-10 countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Japan is not included in the figure because
check usage in Japan is extremely limited, and France is not in-
cluded because it did not report check data for 1999.
7There are two types of debit cards—online and off-line. Online
debit cards use ATM networks to authorize and process transac-
tions and require customers to use a PIN (personal identification
number) code. Off-line debit cards use credit card networks and
are signature-based.
8For a discussion of why stored-value did not succeed in the
United States, see Chakravorti (2000).
9However, there are fixed costs such as the opportunity cost of
holding funds in a zero- or low-interest bearing account and po-
tential monthly fees.
10Bank of America, Washington Mutual, Bank One, Harris Bank,
and Fifth Third have recently started to promote free checking
accounts (Thomson Media, 2001).
11In comparison, 72.5 percent of households had a credit card and
34.5 percent of households had a debit card in 1998 (a substantial
increase from 17.6 percent of households in 1995).
12However, there are several types of merchants, such as gas sta-
tions and restaurants, that do not usually accept checks.
13For more on bill payment, see Andreeff et al. (2001).
14Federal Reserve System (2001) estimates that of the 49.6 billion
checks written in 2000, 19 percent were written at the point of
sale and 12 percent were written at either the point of sale or for
remittance. Therefore, between 9.42 billion and 12.4 billion
checks were written at the point of sale.
15In addition, merchants used third parties to guarantee another 2
percent of the total check volume. According to Nilson (1999b),
the cost for check guarantee services averaged 1.56 percent of the
value of the check in 1999. Note that guaranteed check costs are
significantly higher than those of online debit cards and may be
more than off-line debit cards and credit cards.
16FMI (2000) does not break out the cost of fraud for verified and
unverified checks, so we are using FMI (1998) for this portion of
the analysis.
17We should note that based on the average cost per transaction,
FMI (2000) shows that online debit cards are still the cheapest means
of payment. On a per transaction basis, online debit cards cost $0.34,
verified checks cost $0.36, and unverified checks cost $0.38.
18Comparatively, on a per transaction basis, the cost of debit cards
rose from an average of $0.30 in 1994 and $0.29 in 1997 to $0.34
in 2000.
19Both the Star and NYCE networks have increased their maximum
fees for supermarkets to 19 cents, while Interlink has raised this
fee to 20 cents.
20In 2000, 32 million checks were converted to ACH payments at
retail locations (National Automated Clearing House Association,
2001).
21For a theoretical exposition of credit extensions and their ben-
efits to merchants, see Chakravorti and To (1999).
22The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001)
states that the average per check fee was about 21 cents for inter-
est-bearing accounts. Check revenue would be similar for accounts
that did not charge per-check fees if the average account holder
wrote 9.5 checks. See FMI (1998) for merchants’ fees from checks.
23As of the end of 2000, Interlink charged the highest online debit-
card-processing fee of 20 cents for point-of-sale transactions. Af-
ter recent price increases, Interlink still charges the highest fees
with a maximum of 45 cents for point-of-sale transactions.
24According to a recent survey by Dove Consulting and Pulse EFT,
6 percent of financial institutions charge extra fees for using PIN-
based debit cards at the point of sale. The study found that an av-
erage fee of $1 is being charged to consumers because the low-
interchange offered on PIN-based debit transactions does not ad-
equately cover processing costs. See Breitkopf (2002).
25Off-line debit cards offer issuers significant revenues in the form
of interchange fees that could offset the decrease in insufficient-
funds fees. This lucrative interchange revenue may be partly re-
sponsible for the increase in popularity of debit cards since their
introduction in the early 1990s (see figure 4).
26For a historical perspective on the Fed’s role, see Gilbert (1998)
and Summers and Gilbert (1996).
27See Federal Reserve System (2001).
28For a discussion of the private sector response to Fed pricing
polices resulting from the MCA, see Frodin (1984). For a histori-
cal perspective on retail payment services and the MCA, see
Kuprianov (1985).
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29The Fed’s share is taken as a percentage of interbank check vol-
ume ignoring any changes in on-us volume.
30The last comprehensive study of the payment system by the
Federal Reserve prior to the 2001 study placed the share of on-us
check volume at 30 percent in 1979. The 2001 Fed study also put
the on-us check share at 30 percent.
31For more discussion of cross-subsidization, see Faulhaber (1975).
32By mandate, the Fed must recover costs from the financial services
it provides. Investments in equipment are amortized over years.
Thus, it appears that the Fed expects the demand for its check-
clearing services will not decline significantly in the near future.
33A number of other private-sector initiatives have also been un-
dertaken to truncate checks at the point of sale and through lock
boxes. In most cases, these initiatives take the magnetic ink char-
acter recognition (MICR) information and turn the payment into
an ACH transaction.
34Some observers do not categorize credit cards as electronic pay-
ments, because in most instances the statement is provided on paper
and most payments are made by check. However, for most mer-
chants, credit cards are processed, cleared, and settled electronically.
35There are differences in consumer liability across payment instru-
ments. For a discussion, see Spiotto (2001). For a discussion of how
evolving payment instruments and applications have leveraged the
existing payment infrastructure, see Mantel and McHugh (2002).
36This case is currently awaiting trial.
37See Evans and Schmalensee (1999) for a discussion of network
rules and history.
38For more details on online P2P systems, see Kuttner and
McAndrews (2001) and McHugh (2002).
39In some cases, P2P providers have created their own medium of
exchange, but most also allow consumers to easily convert the
value into good funds.
40PayPal, the leading provider of electronic person-to-person pay-
ments, indicated that 66.9 percent of its payment volume in 2001
originated from online auctions. See McHugh (2002) for a discus-
sion of PayPal and its services.
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